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A popular method in practice offloads computation and storage in blockchains by relying
on committing only hashes of off-chain data into the blockchain. This mechanism is acknowl-
edged to be vulnerable to a stalling attack: the blocks corresponding to the committed hashes
may be unavailable at any honest node. The straightforward solution of broadcasting all
blocks to the entire network sidesteps this data availability attack, but it is not scalable. In
this work, we propose ACeD, a scalable solution to this data availability problem with O(1)
communication efficiency, the first to the best of our knowledge. The key innovation is a
new protocol that requires each of the N nodes to receive only O(1/N) of the block, such
that the data is guaranteed to be available in a distributed manner in the network. Our
solution creatively integrates coding-theoretic designs inside of Merkle tree commitments
to guarantee efficient and tamper-proof reconstruction; this solution is distinct from Asyn-
chronous Verifiable Information Dispersal [1] (in guaranteeing efficient proofs of malformed
coding) and Coded Merkle Tree [2] (which only provides guarantees for random corruption
as opposed to our guarantees for worst-case corruption). We implement ACeD with full
functionality in 6000 lines of Rust code, integrate the functionality as a smart contract into
Ethereum via a high-performance implementation demonstrating up to 10,000 transactions
per second in throughput and 6000x reduction in gas cost on the Ethereum testnet Kovan.
The code is available in [3].
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Public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have demonstrated themselves to be
secure in practice (more than a decade of safe and live operation in the case of Bitcoin), but
at the expense of poor performance (throughput of a few transactions per second and hours
of latency). Design of high performance (high throughput and low latency) blockchains
without sacrificing security has been a major research area in recent years, resulting in
new proof of work [4, 5, 6, 7], proof of stake [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], and hybrid [13, 14] consensus
protocols. These solutions entail a wholesale change to the core blockchain stack and existing
blockchains can only potentially upgrade with very significant practical hurdles (e.g.: hard
fork of existing ledger). To address this concern, high throughput scaling solutions are
explored via “layer 2” methods, including payment channels [15, 16] and state channels
[17, 18, 19]. These solutions involve “locking” a part of the ledger on the blockchain and
operating on this trusted, locked state on an application layer outside the blockchain; however
the computations are required to be semantically closely tied to the blockchain (e.g.: using
the same native currency for transactions) and the locked nature of the ledger state leads to
limited applications (especially, in a smart contract platform such as Ethereum).
In practice, a popular form of scaling blockchain performance is via the following: a smaller
blockchain (henceforth termed “side blockchain”) derives trust from a larger blockchain
(henceforth termed “trusted blockchain”) by committing the hashes of its blocks periodi-
cally to the trusted blockchain (Fig.1.1a). The ordering of blocks in the side blockchain is
now determined by the order of the hashes in the trusted blockchain; this way the security of
the side blockchain is directly derived from that of the trusted blockchain. This mechanism is
simple, practical and efficient – a single trusted blockchain can cheaply support a large num-
ber of side blockchains, because it does not need to store, process or validate the semantics
of the blocks of the side blockchains, only storing the hashes of them. It is also very popular
in practice, with several side blockchains running on both Bitcoin and Ethereum; exam-
ples include donation trace (Binance charity [20]) and diplomas and credentials verification
(BlockCert used by MIT among others [21]).
For decentralized operations of this simple scaling mechanism, any node in the side
blockchain should be able to commit hashes to the trusted blockchain. This simple op-
eration, however, opens up a serious vulnerability: an adversarial side blockchain node can










































































































































































Figure 1.1: (a) Side blockchains commit the hashes of blocks to a larger trusted bl ckchain.
(b) An oracle layer is intro u d to ensure data availability. (c) ACeD is a data availability
oracle.
Thus, while the hash i part of the ordering according to the trusted blockchain, the block
corresponding to the hash is itself unavailable at any side blockchain node; this data avail-
ability attack is a serious threat to the liveness of the side blockchain. The straightforward
solution to this data availability attack is to store all blocks on the trusted blockchain, but
the communication and storage overhead for the trusted blockchain is directly proportional
to the size of the side blockchains and the mechanism is no longer scalable.
We propose an intermediate “data availability oracle” layer that interfaces between the
side blockchains and the trusted blockchain (Fig. 1.1b). The oracle layer accepts blocks
from side blockchains, pushes verifiable commitments to the trusted blockchain and ensures
data availability to the side blockchains. The oracle layer nodes work together to reach
a consensus about whether the proposed block is retrievable (i.e., data is available) and
only then commit it to the trusted blockchain. The key challenge is how to securely and
efficiently share the data amongst the oracle nodes to verify data availability; if all oracle
nodes maintain a copy of the entire side blockchain data locally (i.e., repetition), then that
obviously leads to simple majority vote-based retrievability but is not scalable. If the data
is dispersed among the nodes to reduce redundancy (we call this “dispersal”), even one
malicious oracle node can violate the retrievability. Thus it appears there is an inherent
trade-off between security and efficiency.
The main point of this thesis is to demonstrate that the trade-off between security and
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efficiency is not inherent; the starting point of our solution is the utilization of an erasure
code such that different oracle nodes receive different coded chunks. A key issue is how to
ensure the integrity and correctness of the coded chunks. Intuitively we can use a Merkle
tree to provide the proof of inclusion for any chunk, but a malicious block producer can
construct a Merkle tree of a bunch of nonsense symbols so that no one can successfully
reconstruct the block. To detect such attacks, nodes can broadcast what they received and
meanwhile download chunks forwarded by others to decode the data and check the correct-
ness. Such a method is used in an asynchronous verifiable information dispersal (AVID)
protocol proposed by [1]. AVID makes progress on storage savings with the help of erasure
code but sacrifices communication efficiency. Nodes still need to download all data chunks;
hence, the communication complexity is propotional to the number of oracle nodes. An
alternative approach to detect incorrect coding attacks is via an incorrect-coding proof (also
called fraud proof), which contains symbols that fail the parity check and can be provided
by any node who tries to reconstruct the data; consider using an (n, k) Reed-Solomon code
(which is referred as 1D-RS), with k coded symbols in the fraud proof, essentially not much
better than downloading the original block (n symbols). For reducing the size of fraud proof,









on all columns and rows to generate n2 coded symbols; 2D-RS reduces the fraud proof size
to O(
√
b log b) if we assume symbol size is constant.
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
Our main technical contribution is a new protocol, called Authenticated Coded Disper-
sal (ACeD), that provides a scalable solution to the data availability oracle problem. We
compare the performance between ACeD and other solutions in Table 1.1. In summary of
the performance of erasure code based methods, a scalable solution must defend against the
incorrect coding attack while minimizing the storage and communication cost. 1D-RS has
low communication complexity but when the storing node is adversarial, the storage and
download overhead are factor b worse than optimal. The storage and download overhead of
AVID remains optimal even under adversarial storing node but the communication complex-
ity is factor N worse than optimal. In comparison, ACeD achieves near-optimal performance
on all parameters: optimal storage, download and communication overhead under the nor-
mal path, and near-optimal (worse by a logarithmic factor) storage and download overhead
when the storing node is adversarial. We state and prove the security of the data availability
guarantee and efficiency properties of ACeD in a formal security model (Chapter 4.2). A
full analysis on each performance entry in the table is provided in Chapter 4.3.
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Table 1.1: Performance metrics for different data availability oracles (N : number of oracle
nodes, b: block size).
maximal normal case worst case
communication
complexity
adversary storage download storage download
fraction overhead overhead overhead overhead
uncoded (repetition) 1/2 O(N) O(1) O(N) O(1) O(Nb)
uncoded (dispersal) 1/N O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(b)
AVID [1] 1/3 O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(Nb)
1D-RS 1/2 O(1) O(1) O(b) O(b) O(b)
2D-RS [22] 1/2 O(1) O(1) O(
√
b log b) O(
√
b log b) O(b)
ACeD 1/2 O(1) O(1) O(log b) O(log b) O(b)
Table 1.2: System Performance Metrics
Metric Formula Explanation
Maximal adversary fraction β
The maximum number of adversaries is
βN .
Storage overhead Dstore/Dinfo
The ratio of total storage used and total
information stored.
Download overhead Ddownload/Ddata
The ratio of the size of downloaded data
and the size of reconstructed data.
Communication complexity Dmsg Total number of bits communicated.
1.3 OVERVIEW
There are four core components in ACeD, as is shown in Fig.1.1c with the following
highlights.
• ACeD develops a novel coded commitment generator called Coded Interleaving Tree
(CIT), which is constructed layer by layer in an interleaved manner embedded with
erasure codes. The interleaving property avoids downloading extra proof and thus
minimizes the number of symbols needed to store.
• A dispersal protocol is designed to disperse tree chunks among the network with the
least redundancy and we show how feasible dispersal algorithms ensure the reconstruc-
tion of all data.
• A hash-aware peeling decoder is used to achieve linear decoding complexity. The fraud
proof is minimized to a single parity equation.
Our main mathematical claim is that safety of ACeD holds as long as the trusted blockchain
is secure, and ACeD is live as long as the trusted blockchain is live and a majority of or-
acle nodes are honest (i.e., follow protocol) (Chapter 4.2). ACeD is the first scalable data
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availability oracle that promises storage and communication efficiency while providing a
guarantee for security with a provable bound and linear retrieval complexity; see Table 1.1
with details deferred to Chapter 4.2. The block hash commitment on the trusted blockchain
and the size of fraud proof are both in constant size.
Incentives. From a rational action point of view, oracle nodes are naturally incentivized
to mimic others’ decisions without storing/operating on their own data. This “information
cascade” phenomenon is recognized as a basic challenge of actors abandoning their own in-
formation in favor of inferences based on actions of earlier people when making sequential
decisions [23]. In the context of ACeD, we carefully use the semantics of the data dispersal
mechanisms to design a probabilistic auditing mechanism that ties the vote of data availabil-
ity to an appropriate action by any oracle node. This allows us to create a formal rational
actor model where the incentive mechanism can be mathematically modeled: we show that
the honest strategy is a strong Nash equilibrium; the details are deferred to Chapter §5.6.
Algorithm to system design and implementation. We design an efficient system
architecture implementing the ACeD components. Multithreaded erasure code encoding and
block pipelining designs significantly parallelize the operations leading to a high performing
architecture. We implement this design in roughly 6000 lines of code in Rust and integrate
ACeD with Ethereum (as the trusted blockchain). We discuss the design highlights and
implementation optimizations in Chapter 5.1.
Evaluation. ACeD is very efficient theoretically, but also in practice. Our implementation
of ACeD is run by lightweight oracle nodes (e.g.: up to 6 CPU cores) communicating over
a wide area network (geographically situated in three continents) and is integrated with the
Ethereum testnet Kovan with full functionality for the side blockchains to run Ethereum
smart contracts. Our implementation scales a side blockchain throughput up to 10,000 tx/s
while adding a latency of only a few seconds. Decoupling computation from Ethereum (the
trusted blockchain) significantly reduces gas costs associated with side blockchain transac-
tions: in our experiments on a popular Ethereum app Cryptokitties, we find that the gas
(Ethereum transaction fee) is reduced by a factor of over 6000. This is the focus of Chapter
5.5.
5
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
2.1 BLOCKCHAIN SCALING
Achieving the highest throughput and lowest latency blockchains has been a major focus
area; this research has resulted in new proof of work [4, 5, 6, 7], proof of stake [8, 9, 10, 11, 12],
and hybrid [13, 14] consensus protocols. Scaling throughput linearly with the number of
nodes in the network (known as horizontal scaling) is the focus of sharding designs: partition
the blockchain and parallelize the computation and storage responsibilities [24, 25, 26]. Both
horizontal and vertical scaling approaches directly impact the core technology (“ layer 1”) of
the blockchain stack and their implementation in existing public blockchains is onerous. An
alternate approach is to lock parts of the state of the blockchain and process transactions
associated with this locked state in an application layer: this approach includes payment
channels[15, 16] and state channels [17, 18, 19]. In this paper we are concerned with a third
(and direct) form of blockchain scaling: we interact very lightly with the trusted blockchain
(only storing hashes of each block of the side blockchains) but design and implement an
oracle that allows for scalable secure interactions between the side blockchains and the
trusted blockchain.
2.2 DATA AVAILABILITY
Blockchain nodes that do not have access to all of the data (e.g.: light nodes in simple
payment verification clients in Bitcoin) are susceptible to the data availability attack. One
approach makes use of zero knowledge proofS to represent the delta of the blockchain state,
eliminating the need for the entire data[27]. Another approach is to have the light nodes rely
on full nodes to notify the misbehavior of a malicious block proposer (which has withheld
the publication of the full block). Coding the blockchain data to improve the efficiency of
fraud proofs was first suggested in [28] (using 2D Reed-Solomon codes), and was strongly
generalized by [2] via a cryptographic hash accumulator called Coded Merkle Tree (CMT)
to generate the commitment of the block. Light nodes randomly sample symbols through
anonymous channels and by collecting sampling results, an honest full node can either recon-
struct the block or provide incorrect-coding proof. CMT reduces the proof size compared to
[28]. However, the sampling mechanism is probabilistic (and not appropriate for implemen-
tation in the oracle setting of this paper); further CMT requires anonymous communication
channels. In this paper, we propose an alternate coded Merkle tree construction (CIT) that
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is specific to the oracle operation: the method is equipped with a “push” scheme to efficiently
and deterministically disseminate data among oracle nodes (no communication anonymity
is needed).
Another perspective to understand the data availability problem is to find a secure, effi-
cient way of dispersing data in the network and prove it is permanently retrievable. Such a
problem has been discussed under the context of asynchronous verifiable information disper-
sal (AVID)[1], which applies erasure code to convert a file into a vector of symbols which later
are hashed into a fingerprint. The symbols together with the fingerprint are disseminated
to nodes. Then each node checks the hash and broadcasts its received copy for guaranteeing
retrievability. AVID improves storage saving but sacrifices communication efficiency; the
performance is summarized in Table 1.1, with details in Chapter 4.3. The key insight of
ACeD is that by using codes designed to have short fraud proofs, it is possible to avoid the
additional echo phase in AVID where honest nodes flood the chunks to each other and thus
provide near-optimal communication efficiency.
2.3 ERASURE CODE
An erasure code encodes a string of input bytes into a string of output bytes which
can tolerate missing bytes or check if bytes are modified by using some special decoding
algorithms. Suppose we want to encode a block of b bytes, first we divide b bytes into k
symbols(a fixed number chunks of bytes), each of b/k bytes, some padding is used if they
do not divide perfectly; then we choose an appropriate code which transforms k symbols to
n > k symbols for supporting erasure resistance. This ratio k/n is called coding ratio, and
usually it is a constant fraction like 1/2, 1/4. Many codes offer erasure resistance property
including 1D-RS, 2D-RS[22], but we choose LDPC (linear density parity check) code for
its special properties discussed below. LDPC decodes very efficiently by possibly sacrificing
the encoding efficiency; in the encoding process, we apply n linear operations over various
subsets of k symbols for generating n coded symbols, the operations can be represented
as a encoding matrix; while at decoding side, only a few symbols out of n coded symbols
are required to check the validity of those symbols; this can be checked by computing if
they produce a zero vector after a linear operations, which is captured in a parity equation.
We shown in the Chapter 5 that the scheme we are using with LPDC only use number of
symbol of roughly O(log b) bytes, whereas both 1D-RS and 2D-RS requires the decoder to
download all b bytes and O(
√
b log b) bytes to run the decoding algorithm assuming symbol
size is constant. Erasure Code provides erasure resistance, but there is a limit on how many
modified or missing symbols can be tolerated. To capture this property, every erasure code
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has a parameter called undecodable ratio. The set of symbols that meets the undecodable
ratio is called a stopping set, and there might be multiple of such set. In the CMT[2] paper,
the undecodable ratio is 0.125; both 1D-RS and 2D-RS can produce codes that tolerate
any ratio of missing symbols. To compensate high encoding complexity, in Chapter 5.1 and
Chapter 5.2 we discussed possible ways to parallelize LPDC encoding algorithm for a faster
block generation rate. A formal introduction to LDPC can be found at [29] Section 3.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AVAILABILITY ORACLE
3.1 NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The system is made up of three components: a trusted blockchain (that stores commit-
ments and decides ordering), clients (nodes in side blockchains who propose data), and an
intermediate oracle layer ensuring data availability (see Fig.1.1c).
There are two types of nodes in the network: oracle nodes and clients.
Oracle nodes are participants in the oracle layer. They receive block commitment requests
from clients, including block headers, and a set of data chunks. After verifying the integrity
and correctness of the data, they vote to decide whether the block is available or not and
submit the results to the trusted blockchain.
Clients propose blocks and request the oracle layer to store and commit the blocks. They
periodically update the local ledger according to the commitment states from the trusted
blockchain and ask oracle nodes for the missing blocks on demand.
One of the key assumptions of our system is that the trusted blockchain has a persistent
order of data and liveness for its service. Besides, we assume that in the oracle layer, there
is a majority of honest nodes. For clients, we only assume that at least one client is honest
(for liveness). Oracle nodes are connected to all clients. The network is synchronous, and
the communication is authenticated and reliable.
3.2 ORACLE MODEL
The oracle layer is introduced to offload the storage and ensure data availability. The
network of oracle layer consists of N oracle nodes, which can interact with clients to provide
data availability service. There exists an adversary that is able to corrupt up to βN oracle
nodes. Any node if not corrupted is called honest.
The basic data unit for the oracle layer is a block. A data availability oracle comprises of
the following primitives which are required for committing and retrieving a block B.
1. Generate chunks: When a client wants to commit a blockB to the trusted blockchain,
it runs (generate commitment(B,M)) to generate a commitment c for the block B and
a set of M chunks c1, ..cM which the block can be reconstructed from.
2. Disperse chunks: There is a dispersal protocol disperse(B, (c1, .., cM), N) which can
be run by the client and specifies which chunks need to be sent to which of the N
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oracle nodes.
3. Oracle finalization: The oracle nodes run a finalization protocol to finalize and
accept certain blocks whose commitments are written into the trusted blockchain.
4. Retrieve Data: Clients can initiate a request (retrieve, c) for retrieving a set of chunks
for any commitment c that has been accepted by the oracle.
5. Decode Data: There is a primitive decode(c, {ci}i∈S) that any client can run to
decode the block from the set of chunks {ci}i∈S retrieved for the commitment. The
decoder also returns a proof that the decoded block B is related to the commitment.
We characterize the security of the oracle model and formally define data availability oracle
as follows,
Definition 3.1. A data availability oracle for a trusted blockchain accepts blocks from
clients and writes commitments into the trusted blockchain with the following properties:
1. Termination: If an honest client initiates a disperse request for a block B, then block
B will be eventually accepted and the commitment c will be written into the trusted
blockchain.
2. Availability If a dispersal is accepted, whenever an honest client requests for retrieval
of a commitment c, the oracle is able to deliver either a block B or a null block ∅ and
prove its relationship to the commitment c.
3. Correctness: If two honest clients on running (retrieve, c) receives B1 and B2, then
B1 = B2. If the client that initiated the dispersal was honest, we require furthermore
that B1 = B, the original dispersed block.
A naive oracle satisfying all above expectations is trivial to construct, e.g., sending all
oracle nodes a full copy of data. However, what we want is a scalable data availability
oracle. To better understand this motivation, in the next chapter, we will introduce some
metrics to concretize the oracle properties.
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CHAPTER 4: AUTHENTICATED CODED DISPERSAL
4.1 TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF ACED
In this section, we describe the four components of ACeD: CIT, dispersal protocol, retrieval




































Figure 4.1: The pipeline for a block to be committed in trusted blockchain.
4.1.1 Coded Interleaving Tree
The first building block of ACeD is a coded commitment generator which takes a block
proposed by a client as an input and creates three outputs: a commitment, a sequence of
coded symbols, and their proof of membership POM – see Figure 4.1. The commitment is
the root of a coded interleaving tree (CIT), the coded symbols are the leaves of CIT in the
base layer, and POM for a symbol includes the Merkle proof (all siblings’ hashes from each
layer) and a set of parity symbols from all intermediate layers. A brief overview to erasure
coding can be found in Chapter 2.3.
The construction process of an example CIT is illustrated in figure 4.2. Suppose a block
has size b, and its CIT has ` layers. The first step to construct the CIT is to divide the
block evenly into small chunks, each is called a systematic symbol. The size of a systematic
symbol is denoted as c, so there are s` = b/c systematic symbols. And we apply erasure
codes with coding ratio r ≤ 1 to generate m` = s`/r coded symbols in base layer. Then
by aggregating the hashes of every q coded symbols we get m`/q systematic symbols for its
parent layer (layer `− 1), which can be further encoded to m`−1 = m`/(qr) coded symbols.
We aggregate and code the symbols iteratively until the number of symbols in a layer decays
to t, which is the size of the root.
11
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Figure 4.2: (1) CIT construction process of a block with s` = 8 systematic symbols, applied
with erasure codes of coding ratio r = 1/4. The batch size q = 8 and the number of hashes
in root is t = 4. (2) Circled symbols constitute the 15th base layer coded symbol and its
POM . The solidly circled symbols are the base layer coded symbol and its Merkle proof
(intermediate systematic symbols), the symbols circled in dash are parity symbols sampled
deterministicly.
For all layers j except for root, 1 ≤ j ≤ `, denote the set of all mj coded symbols as Mj,
which contains two disjoint subsets of symbols: systematic symbols Sj and parity symbols
Pj. The number of systematic symbols is sj = rmj. Specifically, we set Sj = [0, rmj) and
Pj = [rmj,mj). Given a block of s` systematic symbols in the base layer, the aggregation
rule for the k-th systematic symbol in layer j − 1 is defined as follows:
Qj−1[k] = {H(Mj[x]) | x ∈ [0,Mj), k = x mod rmj−1} (4.1)
Mj−1[k] = H(concat(Qj−1[k])) (4.2)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ ` and H is a hash function. Q[k] is the tuple of hashes that will be used
to generate k-th symbol in the parent layer and concat represents the string concatenation
function which will concatenate all elements in an input tuple.
Generating a POM for a base layer symbol can be considered as a layer by layer sampling












Each function maps a base layer symbol to two symbols of the specified layer: one is a
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systematic symbol and the other is a parity symbol. We denote the two symbols with a
tuple of functions fj(i) = (pj(i), ej(i)), where pj(i) is the sampled systematic symbol and
ej(i) is the sampled parity symbol, each is defined as follows:
pj(i) = i mod rmj−1; ej(i) = rmj−1 + (i mod (1− r)mj−1) (4.4)
where pj : [m`]→ [0, rmj−1) and ej : [m`]→ [rmj−1,mj−1). Note that the sampled non-base
layer systematic symbols are automatically the Merkle proof for both systematic and parity
symbols in the lower layer.
There are two important properties of the sampling function. (1) It guarantees that if at
least η ≤ 1 ratio of distinct base layer symbols along with their POM are sampled, then in
every intermediate layer, at least η ratio of distinct symbols are already picked out by the
collected POM . It ensures the reconstruction of each layer of CIT (Lemma 4.1, reconstruction
property). (2) All sampled symbols at each layer have a common parent (Lemma 4.2, sibling
property), which ensures the space efficiency of sampling.
These two properties are formally stated below.
Lemma 4.1. (Reconstruction) For any subset of base layer symbols W`, denote Wj :=⋃
i∈W` fj(i) as the set of symbols contained in POM of all symbols in W`. If |W`| ≥ ηm`,
then ∀j ∈ [1, `], |Wj| ≥ ηmj.
Lemma 4.2. For any functions pj(i) and ej(i) defined in equation 4.4, where 1 ≤ j ≤ `,
0 ≤ i < m`, pj(i) and ej(i) are siblings.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 utilizes the property when generating POM given base layer
symbols (see details in Appendix A.2). Lemma 4.2 indicates that in each layer, there are
exactly two symbols included in the POM for a base layer symbol and no extra proof is
needed since they are siblings (see proof details in Appendix A.3).
As described above, CIT can be represented by parameters T = (c, t, r, α, q, d) . All
parameters have been defined except α, which is the undecodable ratio of an erasure code
and d, which is the number of symbols in a failed parity equation. Both of them will be
discussed in the decoder section (Section 4.1.3).
Comparison with CMT (1) CIT is designed for the Push model (the client sends different
chunks to different nodes) whereas CMT is designed for the Pull model (the nodes decide
which chunks to sample from the client). (2)The CIT provides an ideal property (Lemma 2)
that ensures reconstruction from any set of nodes whose size is greater than a given threshold.
Thus as long as enough signatures are collected and we can be assured that the honest subset
represented therein is larger than this threshold, we are guaranteed reconstruction in CIT.
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This is not the case in CMT, whose guarantees are probabilistic since each node samples
data in a probabilistic manner. (3) On the technical side, CIT requires a new interleaving
layer as well as a dispersal mechanism which decides how to assign the different symbols
from intermediate layers to different groups. (4) Furthermore, CMT requires an assumption
of an anonymous network whereas CIT does not require an anonymous network.
4.1.2 Dispersal Protocol
Given the commitment, coded symbols and POM generated by CIT, the dispersal protocol
is used to decide the chunks all oracle nodes need to store. Consider a simple model where
there are M = b/(cr) chunks to be distributed to N nodes (each node may receive k chunks)
such that any γ fraction of nodes together contains η fraction of chunks. The efficiency of
the dispersal protocol is given by λ = M/(Nk). We define the dispersal algorithm formally
as follows,
Definition 4.1. The chunk dispersal algorithm is said to achieve parameters set (M,N, γ, η, λ)
if there is a collection of sets C = {A1, ..., AN} such that Ai ⊆ [M ], |Ai| = MNλ . Also, for any
S ⊆ [N ] with |S| = γN , it holds that |
⋃
i∈S
Ai| ≥ ηM .
To simplify the 5 dimensional region, we consider the tradeoff on the three quantities: a
certain triple (γ, η, λ) is said to be achievable if for any N , there exists M such that the
chunk dispersal algorithm can achieve parameters set (M,N, γ, η, λ). In the ACeD model,
γ is constrained by security threshold β since the clients can only expect to collect chunks
from at most (1 − β)N nodes. η is constrained by the undecodable ratio α of the erasure
code since the total chunks a client collects should enable the reconstruction. So for a given
erasure code, there is a trade-off between dispersal efficiency and security threshold.
Our main result is the demonstration of a dispersal protocol with near optimal parameters
(Lemma 4.3).
Lemma 4.3. If γ
λ
< η, then (γ, η, λ) is not feasible. If γ
λ
> log( 1
1−η ) then (γ, η, λ) is feasible
and there exists a chunk dispersal protocol with these parameters.
We provide a sketch of proof. If γ
λ
< η, the maximum number of distinct symbols is
M
Nλ
· γM = Mγ
λ




1−η ), we prove that the probability of C is not a valid code can vanish to as small
as we want. The problem is transformed to the upper bound of P (Y < ηM) use a standard
inequality from the method of types [30], where Y is the number of distinct chunks sampled.
By sampling γ
λ
M chunks from a set of M chunks randomly, we have P (Y < ηM) ≤ e−f(·)·M ,
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where f(·) is a positive function. So the probability of C is a valid code can be positive,
which proves the existence of a deterministic chunk distribution algorithm. And we can
control the probability of C is not a valid code to be vanishingly small. The detailed proof
of the result can be found in Appendix §A.1.
In the dispersal phase, all oracle nodes wait for a data commitment c, k assigned chunks
and the corresponding POM . The dispersal is accepted if γ + β fraction of nodes vote that
they receive the valid data.
4.1.3 Retrieval Protocol and Block Decoding
When a client wants to retrieve the stored information, the retrieval protocol will ask
the oracle layer for data chunks. Actually, given erasure codes with undecodable ratio α, an
arbitrary subset of codes with the size of over ratio 1−α is sufficient to reconstruct the whole
block. When enough responses are collected, a hash-aware peeling decoder introduced in [2]
will be used to reconstruct the block. The decoding starts from the root of CIT to the leaf
layer and for each layer, it keeps checking all degree-0 parity equations and then finding a
degree-1 parity equation to solve in turn. Eventually, either all symbols are decoded or there
exists an invalid parity equation. In the second case, a logarithmic size incorrect-coding proof
is prepared, which contains the inconsistent hash, d coded symbols in the parity equation
and their Merkle proofs. After an agreement is reached on the oracle layer, the logarithmic
size proof is stored in the trusted blockchain to permanently record the invalid block. Oracle
nodes then remove all invalid symbols to provide space for new symbols. In the special case
when the erasure code used by the CIT requires more than (1−α) ratio of symbols to decode
the original block, oracle nodes need to invoke a bad code handling protocol to reset a better
code. We leave details in the Chapter 5.4.
4.1.4 Protocol Summary
In summary, an ACeD system with N oracle nodes and block size b using CIT T and dis-
persal protocolD can be represented by parameters (b,N, T ,D) , where T = (c, t, r, α, q, d) and
D = (γ, η, λ) . The pipeline to commit a block to the trusted blockchain is as follows (see
Figure 4.1).
• A client proposes a block of size b, it first generates a CIT with base layer symbol size c,
number of hashes in root t, coding ratio r and batch size q. There are M = b/(cr) coded
symbols in the base layer. And then it disperses M coded symbols, their POM and
the root of CIT to N oracle nodes using the dispersal protocol D = (γ, η, λ) .
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• Oracle nodes receive the dispersal request, they accept chunks and commitment, verify
the consistency of data, POM and root, vote their results. A block is successfully
committed if there are at least β + γ votes. Upon receiving retrieval requests, oracle
nodes send the stored data to the requester. Upon receiving the fraud proof of a block,
oracle nodes delete the stored data for that block.
• Other clients send retrieval requests to the oracle nodes on demand. Upon receiving
at least η ≥ 1−α fraction of chunks from at least γ oracle nodes, they reconstruct the
block, if a coding error happens, the fraud proof will be sent to the trusted blockchain.
4.2 PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES OF ACED
Theorem 4.1. Given an adversarial fraction β < 1
2
for an oracle layer of N nodes, ACeD
is a data availability oracle for a trusted blockchain with O(b) communication complexity,
O(1) storage and download overhead in the normal case, and O(log b) storage and download
overhead in the worst case.
This result follows as a special case of a more general result below (Theorem 4.2).
Proof. Suppose χ is an ACeD data availability oracle with parameters (b,N, T ,D) where
T = (c, t, r, α, q, d) and D = (γ, η, λ) . There are at most β < 1
2
fraction of adversarial nodes
in the oracle layer. Then by setting r, q, d, t = O(1), c = O(log b), b N , χ is secure as long
as β ≤ 1
2
(1− λ log( 1
α










= O(N) +O(b) +O(b) = O(b)



















the storage and download overhead in the worst case is O(log b), because
c(d− 1)
y
+ d(q − 1) logqr
b
ctr
= O(log b) +O(logqr(
b
log b
) = O(log b)).
QED.
A complete description of the security and performance guarantees of ACeD is below.
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Theorem 4.2. ACeD is a data availability oracle for the trusted blockchain tolerating
at most β ≤ 1/2 fraction of adversarial oracle nodes in an oracle layer of N nodes. The
ACeD is characterized by the system parameters (b,N, T ,D) , where T = (c, t, r, α, q, d) and
D = (γ, η, λ) . y is a constant size of a hash digest, then
1. ACeD is secure under the conditions that








); η ≥ 1− α






















4. In worst case, both storage and download overhead are
c(d− 1)
y
+ d(q − 1) logqr
b
ctr
Proof. We prove the security and efficiency guarantees separately.
Security To prove that ACeD is secure as long as the trusted blockchain is persistent and





); η ≥ 1− α
we prove the following properties as per Definition 3.1.
• Termination. In ACeD, a dispersal is accepted only if there is a valid commitment
submitted to the trusted blockchain. Suppose an honest client requests for dispersal but
the commitment is not written into the trusted blockchain, then either the commitment
is not submitted or the trusted blockchain is not accepting new transactions. Since
1 − 2β ≥ γ, thus β + γ ≤ 1 − β, even if all corrupted nodes remain silent, there are
still enough oracle nodes to vote that the data is available and the commitment will be
submitted, hence the trusted blockchain is not live, which contradicts our assumption.
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• Availability. If a dispersal is accepted, the commitment is on the trusted blockchain
and β + γ oracle nodes have voted for the block. Since the trusted blockchain is
persistent, whenever a client wants to retrieve the block, it can get the commitment
and at least γ nodes will respond with the stored chunks. On receiving chunks from γ
fraction of nodes, for a CIT applying an erasure code with undecodable ratio α and a
feasible dispersal algorithm (γ, η, λ)(Lemma 4.3), because η ≥ 1− α, the base layer is
reconstructable. Further with Lemma 4.1, the entire tree is eventually reconstructed
and the oracle can deliver a block B, and the proof for B’s relationship to commitment
c is the Merkel proof in CIT. If a client detects a failed parity equation and outputs a
null block ∅, it will generate an incorrect-coding proof.
• Correctness. Suppose for a given commitment c, two honest clients reconstruct two
different blocks B1 and B2, the original dispersed block is B.
(1) If the client that initiated the dispersal was honest, according to the availability
property, B1, B2 6= ∅, both clients can reconstruct the entire CIT. If B1 6= B2,
the commitment c1 6= c2, which contradicts our assumption that the trusted
blockchain is persistent.
(2) If the client that initiated the dispersal was adversary and one of the reconstructed
blocks is empty, w.l.o.g suppose B1 = ∅, the client can generate a fraud proof for
the block. If B2 6= ∅, the entire CIT is reconstructed whose root is commitment
c2. Since there is no failed equation in the CIT of B2, c1 6= c2, which contradict
our assumption that the trusted blockchain is persistent.
(3) If the client that initiated the dispersal was adversary and B1, B2 6= ∅, both
clients can reconstruct the entire CIT. If B1 6= B2, the commitment c1 6= c2,
which contradict our assumption that the trusted blockchain is persistent.
Thus we have B1 = B2, and if the client that initiated the dispersal is honest, B1 = B.
Efficiency For any block B, oracle nodes need to store two parts of data, the hash com-
mitment, which consists of t hashes in the CIT root, and k dispersal units where each unit
contains one base layer symbol and two symbols per intermediate layer. Denote the total
storage cost as X, we have




where y is the size of hash, b is the size of block, q is batch size, r is coding rate, and c is
the size of a base layer symbol. Notice that k = b
Nrcλ
, we have










It follows that the communication complexity is NX. In the normal case, each node only
stores X bits hence the storage overhead becomes NX
b
, and similarly when a client downloads
data from N nodes, its overhead is NX
b
. In the worst case, we use incorrect-coding proof
to notify all oracle nodes. The proof for a failed parity equation which contains d coded
symbols consist of d− 1 symbols and their Merkle proofs, denote the size as P , we have




The storage and download overhead in this case is P
y
, the ratio of the proof size and the size
of reconstructed data ,a single hash y. QED.
4.3 PERFORMANCE TABLE
We compared five data dispersal protocols and analyzed their performances using max-
imal adversarial fraction and communication complexity; we further articulate the storage
overhead for the oracle layer and download overhead for each client in two cases depending
on whether there are invalid coding attacks in the system. We define those four key metrics
of system performance; see Table 1.2. Let N be the number of nodes and b be the block size.
“Maximal adversary fraction” measures the fault tolerant capability of the model. “Storage
overhead” measures the ratio of total storage cost and actual information stored. “Download
overhead” measures the ratio of downloaded data size and reconstructed information size.
“Communication complexity” measures the number of bits communicated
In the uncoded repetition data dispersal protocol, a block proposer client sends the original
block to all oracle nodes to ensure the data availability. The system needs more than
1/2 fraction of the votes for committing a block digest of constant y bits into the trusted
blockchain. The total amount of bits communicated equals to Nb, where b is block size
and N is the total number of oracle nodes. Hence the communication complexity is Nb.
In the normal case, when a block is coded correctly, the storage overhead is Nb/b whereas
the download overhead is b/b. When an adversary uploads an invalid block by distributing
different blocks to each node, the worst case for storage overhead is identical to the normal
case, because every oracle nodes have to store the data block to make sure the data is
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available when later adversaries oracle nodes decide to make their block available. The
download efficiency is O(1) because as long as a client contacts an honest oracle node, it is
sufficient to check the data availability.
In the uncoded data dispersal protocol, the block proposer client divides the original block
into N chunks, one for each oracle node. The system cannot tolerate any adversary because
any withheld chunk can make the block unavailable. The total communication complexity is
b since a block is equally distributed. In both normal and worst case, the storage overhead
is b/b because every node only store b/N chunks. Similarly, in both normal and worst cases,
the download overhead is b/b because a client downloads at most b/N chunks from N oracle
nodes.
In the 1D-RS data dispersal protocol, at least 1/2 fraction of oracle nodes need to be
honest for them to agree to commit a block digest. The communication complexity is O(b)
using a chunk dispersal protocol discussed in Chapter 4.1. In the normal case, each node
only stores O(b/N) number of chunks, and therefore the storage overhead is O(1); similarly
when a client node wants to download the block, it collects all chunks from the oracles
node with download overhead O(1). In the worst case, when an adversarial client disperses
chunks with invalid coding, oracle nodes in the end would produce an invalid coding proof for
proving that the block is invalid to all querying clients. In 1D-RS, the fraud proof consists
of all chunks as one needs to decode itself to detect inconsistency. Therefore, the overall
storage is O(N(b/N + log b)), when b is large (b/N >> log b), the overall coding proof size is
O(b). For computing the storage overhead, we consider the total information stored in the
denominator to be the size of the block digest, which is used by a client to start the block
retrieval. When a client requests for an invalid coded block, the client needs to download
the incorrect-coding proof to convince itself that the block is invalid, hence the download
overhead is the same as the storage overhead.
In the 2D-RS data dispersal protocol, at least 1/2 fraction of nodes needs to be honest.
The communication includes the chunks that make up the entire blocks and Merkle trees,
and O(
√
b) of Merkle proof, so in total it takes O(N
√
b + b + N log b) = O(b) bytes. In the
normal case, each node only stores O(b/N) bytes, therefore the storage overhead is O(1),
similarly the download overhead is O(1). In the worst case, when an adversary disperses
invalid coded chunks, each node needs to download
√
b log b bytes for producing the invalid
code proof, according to Table 2 of [22].
In the AVID protocol, oracle nodes run asynchronously with a security threshold 1/3
[1]. During the block dispersal, every oracle nodes needs to recollect sufficient symbols for
reconstructing the original blocks, hence the total communication complexity is O(Nb). In
the normal case, after a block is checked valid at the dispersal phase, each node discard
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chunks except the ones sent from the block producer, hence the storage overhead is O(1);
similarly when another client downloads the data, it only needs to download O(b) data,
hence its download overhead is O(1). When there is an invalid encoding attack , it can be
detected by AVID, and then the nodes would discard the block. Therefore in the worst case,
the storage overhead of AVID has the same performance as its normal case. Similarly, since
AVID can detect invalid encoding before committing to the trusted blockchain, the worst
case download overhead is O(1), the same as its normal case.
In the ACeD dispersal protocol, at least 1/2 fractions of oracle nodes need to be honest
to commit the block digest. The communication complexity is O(b) by using the dispersal
protocol in Chapter 4.1. In the normal case, each node only stores O(b/N) chunks hence the
storage overhead is O(1), and similarly the download overhead is O(1). In the worst case,
when an invalid block is dispersed, oracle layer generates an incorrect-coding proof of size
O(log b) as shown in Theorem 4.1. The incorrect-coding proof is then stored in the trusted
blockchain. When a client queries for such block, the proof is replied so that the client can
be convinced that the block is invalid. For computing the storage and download overhead
in the worst case, we consider both the stored information and the size of the reconstructed
data to be a single hash which is the pointer to the data.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
5.1 SYSTEM DESIGN
ACeD clients are nodes associated with a number of side blockchains; the honest clients
rely on ACeD and the trusted blockchain to provide an ordering service of their ledger
(regardless of any adversarial fraction among the peers in the side blockchain). A client
proposes a new block to all peers in the side blockchain by running ACeD protocol. An
honest client confirms to append the new block to the local side blockchain once the block
hash is committed in the trusted blockchain and the full block is downloaded. As long as
there is a single honest client in the side blockchain, we have the following claim:
Claim 5.1. Once a block is confirmed by an honest client, security is guaranteed as long
as the trusted blockchain is safe, even if the oracle layer is dishonest majority. Liveness is
guaranteed when the trusted blockchain is live and the majority of the oracle layer is honest.
The claim indicates that in side blockchains, the safety of a confirmed block only relies
on the trusted blockchain because the commitment on it is irrefutable once the trusted
blockchain is safe, and the honest client has already downloaded the full block. So even
if the oracle layer is occupied by the dishonest majority, those confirmed blocks are still
safe. However, the liveness relies on the liveness of both ACeD and the trusted blockchain.
As for the side blockchain network, because data persistence is guaranteed by ACeD, any
client inside the network can safely conduct a transaction and reconstruct the ledger without
worrying about a dishonest majority; similarly a valid transaction will eventually join the
ledger as long as there is a single honest client who can include the transaction into a block.
Next we discuss the practical parameter settings for ACeD. We use these parameter choices
to design and implement an ACeD oracle layer that interfaces with Ethereum as the trusted
blockchain.
Parameter Specifications. We study an ACeD system with N = 9000 oracle nodes with
adversarial fraction β = 0.49; the block size b is 12 MB and therefore b  N . In each
block, the base layer symbol size c is 2000 log b ≈ 48 kB, which corresponds to b/c ≈ 256
uncoded symbols in the base layer. Within the setup, we construct a CIT of five layers with
parameters: number of root symbols t = 16, hash size y = 32 bytes, coding ratio r = 0.25,
aggregation batch size q = 8 and 4 erasure codes of size (256,128,64,32) for each non-root
layer. For selecting erasure code properties, we use codes with undecodable ratio α = 0.125,
maximal parity equation size d = 8. In the dispersal protocol, we use η = 0.875 = 1 − α,
which translates to a dispersal efficiency λ ≤ (1 − 2β)/ log 1
1−η = 1/150, and therefore
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each oracle node needs to store roughly 17 symbols. With ACeD characterized by those
parameters, the total communication cost for a client to commit a 12 MB block is roughly
5.38 GB; this represents a 0.5N factor boost over storing just one block. In the normal path,
after accepting the 12 MB block, each oracle node only has to store 448 kB of data, a 3.7%
factor of the original data; if there is an incorrect-coding attack, oracle layer will together
upload data of size 339 kB incorrect-coding proof to the trusted blockchain. To download a
block in the normal path, a client can use a naive method of collecting all symbols from all
oracle nodes. Despite the conservative approach at block reconstruction, the entire download
takes 5.38 GB. A simple optimization involving selectively querying the missing symbols can
save significant download bandwidth: a client only needs 896 coded symbols in the base
layer to reconstruct the block; thus, in the best case only 42 MB is needed to directly receive
those symbols. When there is an incorrect-coding attack, a new user only needs to download
the fraud proof which has been generated by other nodes (either client or oracle nodes); the
proof is only of the size of 339 kB. Table 5.1 tabulates the performance metrics of ACeD
(and baseline schemes) with these parameter settings.
In the uncoded repetition protocol, each node stores the identical block, so the storage
cost for both cases is 12MB. In the uncoded dispersal protocol, because all oracle nodes
are honest, the block is equally divided into N nodes in both cases. In the AVID protocol,
each message has the size (b)/(N − 2Nβ) + y(log2N + 1) = 4.37 kB, so the total amount of
messages exchanged during the broadcasting stage equals to 354GB; AVID does not commit
an invalid block, so only the block hash is required to show the block is invalid. When
β = 0.33 1D-RS uses the same erasure code as AVID to assign each node a symbol, so
their normal case is identical; when there is an incorrect-coding attack, a node needs to
download the whole block to reconstruct the block, therefore in the worst case both storage
and download are 13.4MB. To tolerate β = 0.49, 1D-RS needs to decrease the coding ratio to
0.02 while increasing the symbol size, because 200 nodes are required to start the decoding.
A lower coding ratio requires nodes to store more 67.1 kB data; the download cost are
saved by reducing the number of Merkle proofs, because only 200 symbols are needed for
decoding. Finally, we use the same method to evaluate ACeD with β = 0.33, both normal
case storage and communication complexity improves due to a better dispersal efficiency. In
evaluating the metrics for 2D-RS, we first get a lower bound for the number of honest oracle
nodes available in the decoding phase, which is used to compute the size of a matrix used in
2D-RS, and the goal is to decide a 2D-RS symbol size which guarantees each honest oracle
node with at least one symbol. The 2D-RS looks over-perform ACeD when the adversarial
ratio is 0.33. But if the block size increases from 12MB to 1.2GB while the ratio is 0.33,
the worst case in ACeD needs 279kB, whereas 2D-RS becomes 21.8MB; when the adversary
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Table 5.1: Performance metrics under a specific system parameterization.
maximal normal case worst case
communication
complexity
adversary storage download storage download
fraction cost* cost*† cost* cost*
uncoded (repetition) 0.49 12MB 12MB 12MB 12MB 108GB
uncoded (dispersal) 0 1.3kB 12MB 1.2kB 12MB 12MB
AVID [1] 0.33 4.37kB 13.4MB 32B 32B 354GB
1D-RS 0.33 4.37kB 13.4MB 13.4MB 13.4MB 39.4MB
1D-RS 0.49 67.1kB 12.1MB 12.1MB 12.1MB 604MB
2D-RS 0.33 5.4kB 16.6MB 232.1KB 232.1KB 48.9MB
2D-RS 0.49 72.1kB 13MB 925.6KB 925.6KB 648.6MB
ACeD 0.33 50.3kB 42MB 339kB 339kB 452 MB
ACeD 0.49 597kB 42MB 339kB 339kB 5.38GB
* cost is derived by bN · overhead
† best case
ratio is 0.49, ACeD needs 279 KB for a 1.2GB block, and 2D-RS requires a fault proof of
92.3MB. The downside of ACed is the communication complexity when the block size is
large, a 1.2GB block requires each node communicating 64MB data, whereas 2D-RS only
requires 6.6MB communication.
The ACeD oracle layer interacts with the side blockchains and the trusted blockchain. For
a high performance (high throughput, low gas), the oracle layer and its interaction protocols
have to be carefully designed for software implementation. In this section, we discuss our
system design decisions that guided the implementation.
Architecture. We use Ethereum as the trusted blockchain. The oracle nodes interact
with Ethereum via a special (ACeD) smart contract; the contract is owned by a group
of permissioned oracle nodes, who individually cannot update the contract, except that a
majority of the oracle nodes together agree and perform a single action on the smart contract.
The contract only changes its state after accepting a multisignature of majority votes [31].
We implement both the oracle nodes and side blockchain nodes in RUST; the architecture is
depicted in Figure 5.1. There are four important modules:
(1) Smart contract manager, when used by a side blockchain node, is responsible for
fetching states from the trusted blockchain; when used by an oracle node, it writes state
to the trusted blockchain after the block manager has collected sufficient signatures. (2)
Block manager, when used by a side blockchain node, creates a block (triggered by a
scheduler), and distributes the coded symbols to oracle nodes; when used by an oracle
node and has received messages from side blockchain nodes, the module stores the received
symbols and provides them on demand; When used by an oracle committee node, the module


























Side Blockchain Node Oracle Node
Figure 5.1: The left figure depicts a block diagram of a side node; the right figure depicts an
oracle node. The sharp rectangle represents an active thread; round rectangles are system
states.
(3) Scheduler, when used by a side blockchain node, decides when a node can transmit its
block (and coded symbols) to oracle nodes; when used by an oracle node, the module decides
who the correct block proposer is. (4) Trusted Chain manager, when used by a side node,
periodically pulls state changes from the trusted blockchain; if a new block is updated, it
collects block symbols from all oracle nodes; the module also maintains a blockchain data
structure.
A detailed discussion of the design and implementation optimizations of these four blocks
is provided in Chapter 5.2, which also discusses the data structures that maintain the state
of ACeD.
Implementation Optimizations. The key challenge to a high performance implementa-
tion of ACeD is the large number of interactions among the various system blocks. Since
the trusted blockchain is immutable, we optimize the oracle and side blockchain client
implementations by utilizing parallelism and pipelining as much as possible. (1) LDPC
parallelization2.3: we bring state of the art techniques from wireless communication de-
sign and encoding procedures (Appendix A of [29]) to our implementation of encoding a
block by distributing the workload to many worker threads; we find that the encoding time
is almost quartered using 4 threads. A detailed description is referred to Chapter 5.3. (2)
Block Pipelining. We pipeline signature aggregation, block dispersal and retrieval so that
multiple blocks can be handled at the same time. We also pipelined the trusted chain man-
ager so that a side node can simultaneously request multiple blocks from oracle nodes. The
local state variable, (block id, hash digest), is validated against the smart contract state
whenever a new block is reconstructed locally.
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5.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACED MODULES
The Smart Contract manager is an event loop which waits for the signal from other
managers. Its main purpose is to communicate with the smart contract by either sending
Ethereum transactions to write new states to the smart contract, or calling the smart contract
to read the current state.
The Trusted Chain manager is an event loop used by any side nodes for periodically
pulling the latest state of the main chain by asking the smart contract manager. Every side
node uses it to monitor any state update from the oracle nodes. An update occurs when
the smart contract block id is higher than the block id maintained in the blockchain. Each
side blockchain node queries the trusted blockchain periodically to be aware of the state
change. When a new state is received, the side node queries all oracle nodes using the block
id, for assembling the new block. It then checks Merkle proof in the header to check the
block integrity. Then the module uses the new hash digest in the smart contract to verify
the integrity of the header. The computation is done by hashing the concatenation of the
previous hash digest and the hash digest of the new block header H; then compare it with
the hash digest in the smart contract. The trusted blockchain manager continues until it
completes to the latest state and has a consistent view of the blockchain compared to the
states on the trusted blockchain.
The scheduler runs an endless loop which measures the current time to determine the
correct side node proposer at its moment. It uses the current UNIX EPOCH to compute
the time elapsed from a time reference registered at the contract creation, and divides Slot
Duration, a system parameter, to get the current slot id. Therefore both oracle and side
node can use slot id and the token ring to determine the valid block proposer at the current
time. When a node proposes, its block id is set to the current slot id. After receiving
block symbols using the dispersal protocol, oracle nodes verify the message sender using the
identical scheduling rule. In the special situation while a block is pending in the network
and a new block is proposed in the next slot, the pending block might be updated or rejected
by the smart contract due to the block id rule constraint by the smart contract. Because a
block id is accepted only if it is monotonically increasing, the releasing of the pending block
does not hurt the system in either case: If the pending block arrives to smart contract after
the new block, the pending block is excluded because it has a lower block id than the new
block; if the pending block is included, there might be some conflicting transactions in the
two blocks, but since the transactions in the pending block cannot be arbitrarily updated
by adversaries after its release, the adversaries cannot adaptively damage the system. This
property allows an optimization to improve the throughput (discussed later).
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The block manager is an event loop that sends and receives message among peers. When
an oracle node receives the header and coded symbols from a side node, it stores them into
the symbol database, and submits its signature of the header to its Committee nodes after
it receives a sufficient amount of symbols. If an oracle node is chosen as a committee node,
the node receives the signatures and aggregates them until the number suggests that there
is a sufficient amount of symbols stored in honest nodes. The block manager asks the smart
contract manager to send an Ethereum transaction to write the new state to the smart
contract.
The states of ACeD are maintained in three data structures:
1. block database, residing on persistent storage, is used by Side nodes to store decoded
blocks reconstructed from the oracle nodes
2. symbols database, residing on persistent storage, is used by oracle nodes to store
coded symbols from the Side nodes.
3. mempool, transactions queued in memory to create a block.
The block database is a key-value persistent storage, where the key is block id and the
value is a block B = (H,C) which contains a header H and content C. The header is a tuple
of (blockid,D) where D is the digest of the content C. Instead of relying on a cryptographic
puzzle for accepting blocks, each oracle node uses a deterministic token ring available from
the smart contract to decide which block symbols to accept. The token ring is a list of
registered side chain nodes eligible for proposing blocks. A block is considered valid only if
it is received at the correct time from the correct side node.
5.3 EFFICIENT ENCODING FOR LDPC CODES
A block of transactions is coded to symbols before distributing them to the oracle nodes.
We have implemented a CIT library in RUST; compared to CMT (coded Merkle tree) library,
the major distinction is in the data interleaving algorithm. We find that the encoding time of
CMT is very time consuming: on a Mac 2.6 GHz 6-Core Intel Core i7 computer, the library
required about 34 seconds to encode a 4 MB block on a basis of 128 symbols with 0.25 coding
ratio. The issue is due to a huge amount of XOR operations required for encoding the base
layer. In our implementation, we have developed two strategies to overcome the problem
by adding parallelism to the encoding process and by devising a code transformation that
reduces coding complexity. Parallelization involves two components: a light weight read-only
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hash map and a multiple-thread environment for partitioning the workload. An inverse map
is created whose key is the index of input symbols, and value is a list of parity symbols to
be XOR with according to the encoding matrix. We use a single-producer multiple-workers
paradigm where the producer thread uses the inverse map to properly distribute the input
symbol. Worker threads partition the parity set such that each thread is responsible for
an equal number of parity symbols. The input symbol is communicated through a message
queue, and once a worker receives the input symbol, it XORes the symbol locally. The
producer distributes all input symbols and sends a final control message to all workers to
collect the result. The optimization brings out a significant speedup, reducing the encoding
time of a 4MB block from 31 second to about 10 sec using 4 threads. Adding as many as
10 threads further reduces the encoding time to 8.5 seconds, and eventually hitting physical
(CPU) limits. In the second strategy, we attempted to change Coding matrix to reduce
the number of XOR computation at the root. The conventional encoding complexity of
LDPC codes is O(n2) where n is the length of coded symbols. We could transform the
original encoding matrix to a upper triangular form that has a computation complexity of
O(n). But after a careful analysis, we discover an extra constant factor overkills the reduced
coding complexity, so in the end we rely solely on parallelism to reduce coding latency.
5.4 BAD CODE HANDLING
The LDPC codes are probabilistically generated, and some codes may have smaller stop-
ping size (see Chapter 2.3) than designed due to randomness in the generation process. The
CMT [2] paper section 5.4 table 3 provides the likelihood of such event that a bad code is
generated: when the number of symbols, n, in a layer is 256, the probability of bad code is
0.886; when n=512, prob=5.3e-2; when n=1024, prob=2e-3. The calculation process can be
found at [2] Appendix A. We layout the following protocol for explicitly handling such bad
code.
A bad code handling protocol is triggered by an honest side blockchain node who is
unable to reconstruct a block after receiving a sufficient number of valid chunks from the
oracle layer. The honest side blockchain node sends a bad code message to all oracle nodes
containing the block chunks for demonstrating the code is bad. Then all honest oracle nodes
communicate with each other, and confirm if the code is bad by exchanging their local chunks
to reconstruct the original block. If the code is bad, honest oracle nodes either reconstruct
the block but with more chunks or fail to reconstruct the block. The honest oracle nodes
then vote and write a proof to the main chain so that a new code will be accepted. The
generating process of new codes can be done at each oracle node using a commonly agreed
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seed, which can be setup in the main chain after bad code proof is voted and accepted. The
oracle node then communicates and votes for the new code, and eventually a valid new code
is committed to the main chain.
5.5 EVALUATION
We aim to answer the following questions through our evaluation. (a) What is the highest
throughput (block confirmation rate) that ACeD can offer to the side blockchains in a
practical integration with Ethereum? (b) What latency overhead does ACeD pose to block
confirmation? (c) How much is the gas cost reduced, given the computation (smart contract
execution) is not conducted on the trusted blockchain? (d) What are the bottleneck elements
to performance?
Testbed. We deploy our implementation of ACeD on Vultr Cloud hardware of 6 core
CPU, 16GB memory, 320GB SSD and a 40Gpbs network interface (for both oracle and side
blockchain nodes). To simplify the oracle layer, we consider all of oracle nodes are committee
members, which is reflected in the experiment topology: all the oracle nodes are connected as
a complete graph, and each side blockchain node has TCP connections to each of the oracle
nodes. We deploy a smart contract written in Solidity using the Truffle development tool on a
popular Ethereum testnet: Kovan. Oracle nodes write their smart contracts using Ethereum
accounts created with MetaMask, each loaded with sufficient Keth to pay the gas fee of each
Ethereum transaction. We use an LDPC code of b/c = 128 input symbols with a coding
rate of r = 0.25 to construct CIT with q = 8, d = 8, α = 0.125, η = 0.875, t = 16. We fix the
transaction length to be 316 bytes, which is sufficient for many Ethereum transactions.
Experiment Settings. We consider four separate experiments with varying settings of
four key parameters: the number of oracle nodes, the number of side blockchain nodes,
block generation rate, and block size. The experiment results are in Figure 5.2.
Table 5.2: Four different experiments varying the parameters of ACeD.
# side blockchain nodes # oracle nodes Block size(MB) Block generation rate(sec/blk)
A 5 5,10,15,25 4 5
B 5,10,20 10 4 5
C 5 10 4,8,16 5
D 3,5,8,10 10 4 8.33,5,3.125,2.5
(1) Throughput. We measure the rate of state update in the trusted blockchain as viewed
from each oracle blockchain nodes; the throughput is then the rate averaged across time and
across oracle blockchain nodes. The throughput performance changes with four parameters:
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In experiments A and B, the throughput is not noticeably impacted as the number of oracles
or side blockchain nodes increases. In experiment C, the block size has roughly a linear effect
on throughput, which continues until coding the block is too onerous (either it costs too much
memory or takes too long). In experiment D, we fix the product of the block generating rate
and the number of side blockchain node to constant, while increasing the block generation
rate, the throughput increases linearly; the performance will hit a bottleneck when the
physical hardware cannot encode a block in a time smaller than the round time.
(2) The latency of ACeD is composed of three major categories: block encoding time,
oracle vote collection time and time to update the trusted blockchain. We find latency stays
relatively constant in all experiments (the exception is experiment C where block encoding
is onerous).
(3) Gas saving. ACeD transactions cost significantly less gas than a regular Ethereum
transaction, independent of the computational complexity of the transaction itself. The cost
of an ACeD transaction voted by 10 oracles nodes on a 4MB block costs on average 570K
gas. Based on a historical analysis of 977 Crytokitties transactions, we estimate a 220 byte
transaction costing roughly 180,000 gas: ACeD gas savings are thus over a factor 6000. We
emphasize that the saving in gas is independent of block generation rate or the block size,
since the smart contract only needs the block header and a list of the oracle signatures.
Figure 5.2: Throughput (left) and Latency (right) for the 4 experiments A, B, C, D.
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5.6 INCENTIVE ANALYSIS
5.6.1 Motivation and Countermeasures
For oracle nodes, downloading and checking data requires nontrivial computation effort,
selfish oracle nodes have an incentive to follow others’ decisions and skip verification to com-
pete for more reward by voting for more blocks. Such a phenomenon, known as information
cascade in the literature, sets forth that people tend to make decisions according to the
inferences based on the actions of earlier people. As a consequence, an oracle node may
submit a vote for a block but can not provide any data when a retrieval request is received.
To solve this problem, we introduce an audit scheme. When a block is added to the side
blockchain, with probability pa, a voted node will be selected to submit the received data
chunks. Our dispersal protocol guarantees that each oracle node ought to store a specific
subset of data chunks. For those committed blocks which are not successfully appended in
the side blockchain, all voted nodes should submit data or lose their stakes.
Even if there are several nodes in the aggregation committee, only the first one who
submits the valid signature can claim the reward, thus rational committee members would
choose to submit votes containing the first bath of signatures. And since only those oracle
nodes whose signatures are used to aggregate the final signature would receive a reward,
nodes with the largest network latency may never get any income. Furthermore, adversaries
can violate an arbitrary subset of honest nodes’ interests by excluding them intentionally.
We can not influence the adversarial behavior, but to encourage selfish nodes to include
more signatures, the committee reward will be proportional to the number of signatures in
final aggregation.
5.6.2 Model
We consider a network to be a set of N configured oracle nodes (oracle nodes) O =
{o1, o2, · · · , oN}. Suppose βN nodes in the network are Byzantine, who behave arbitrarily.
And that every non-Byzantine nodes are Rational, they follow the protocol if it suits them,
and deviate otherwise. In the registration phase, each oracle node needs to deposit an
amount of stake stko for registering a pair of valid BLS key set.
There is a set of blocks proposed by side nodes. To propose a block, the proposer needs
to deposit an amount of stake stkb and will receive block reward B if successful. A fraction
of block reward ηB will be used for rewarding oracle nodes. There is a small committee
C ⊂ O in the oracle layer. If a block is committed, the committee member who submits the
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Table 5.3: Utility functions for different types of nodes. k is the number of signatures
aggregated in committed signature.
strategy block proposer oracle nodes committee member
D −stkb −pastkv + (1− pa)ηBk − rm −stkm
O 0 0 0
C (1− η)B ηB
k
− rm − cs krm − cm
commitment will get an extra reward, which comes from a constant submission fee rm paid
by other oracle nodes.
Basically there are three general actions a node can take, cooperate, offline and defect,
denoted as D,O,C respectively. We define All-C, All-C and All-D representing the strategy
that all nodes choose to be cooperative, offline and defective. We design the utility functions
for the block proposer, oracle nodes and committee members when a block is successfully
committed in Table.5.3.
5.6.3 Incentive Compatibility
A protocol is incentive compatible if rational actors see no increase in their utility from
unilaterally deviating from the protocol. To prove that, there are several things rational
participants may care about.
For oracle nodes, there is a reward for having a block it successfully voted for added to the
side blockchain. They cannot do much to influence the reward, except creating more voting
accounts which means to store more data and deposit more stakes. For the block producer,
there is a reward (1−η)B when the proposed block is added to the side blockchain. Rational
side nodes can’t gain more rewards by deviating the protocol thus have no reason to violate
the protocol. For the committee member, they claim rewards when a vote is accepted and
more participants in aggregation bring more reward to the submission fee.
We prove that All-C strategy is a Nash Equilibrium below.
Theorem 5.1. There exists a strategy {e∗i }i∈[1,n] for all rational oracle nodes in system to
reach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: ∀k ∈ [1, n], k is rational,
E[Uk(e∗k)|{e∗i }i∈[1,n]] ≥ E[Uk(ek)|{e∗i }i 6=k, ek]
and the following statements hold:
1. All-O strategy is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
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Table 5.4: List of symbols used in incentive analysis
Symbol Definition
rm Rewards per signature for a committee member
Bj Block rewards for block j
cs Costs for oracle nodes to verify data chunks
cm Costs for committee members to aggregate signatures
stko Unit stake of oracle nodes
stkm Unit stake of committee members
stkb Stake of block proposer
β Proportion of byzantine nodes
θ Threshold of aggregated signature
η Proportion of block rewards as block proposition cost
pa Probability to audit when a new block is added
2. All-C strategy is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. A protocol is a Byzantine Nash Equilibrium if rational actors see no increase in their
utility from unilaterally deviating from the protocol. Firstly, consider {e∗i }i∈[1,n] = All-O, it
can be easily derived that E[All-O] = 0. Suppose any voter k wants to change the protocol,
no matter it chooses to cooperate or defect, it can not change the consensus thus gets no
reward and even pays some cost for computation when choosing to cooperate, thus All-O is
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.




− rm − cs
The expected utility for k to choose to offline and defect is,
E[ek = O] = 0




Letting E[All-C] > E[ek = D] and E[All-C] > E[ek = O] derives that All-C strategy is a
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium when pa(stkv+1)−cs > 0 and ηB/k > rm+cs. Since both cs and
rm are constant, we can always choose stake value to make it reach the equilibrium. QED.
33
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
Interoperability across blockchains is a major research area. Our work can be viewed as a
mechanism to transfer the trust of an established blockchain (eg: Ethereum) to many small
(side) blockchains. Our proposal, ACeD, achieves this by building an oracle that guarantees
data availability. The oracle layer enabled by ACeD is run by a group of permissioned
nodes which are envisioned to provide an interoperability service across blockchains; we have
provided a detailed specification of ACeD, designed incentives to support our requirement of
an honest majority among the oracle nodes, and designed and evaluated a high performance
implementation.
ACeD solves the data availability problem with near optimal performance on all metrics.
However, when instantiating the system with specific parameters, we observe that some
metrics have to be computed with constant factors which give rise to acceptable but non-
negligible performance loss. The critical bottleneck for ACeD is the lower undecodable ratio
(the fraction of symbols in the minimum stopping set) compared to 1D-RS coding; this
undermines dispersal efficiency and increases the communication cost under the existence of
strong adversary. Therefore, finding a deterministic LDPC code with a higher undecodable
ratio will immediately benefit the practical performance of ACeD; the construction of such
LDPC codes is an exciting direction of future work and is of independent interest.
34
APPENDIX A: PROOF DETAILS
A.1 PROOF OF LEMMA 4.3
We show the existence of (several) chunk dispersal algorithms using the probabilistic
method [32]. Consider a randomized chunk dispersal design, where each element of each Ai
is chosen i.i.d. uniformly randomly from the set of M possible chunks. This gives raise to a
randomized code C. We prove the following statement:
P{C is NOT a (M,N, γ, η, λ) code} ≤ e−n (A.1)
Let k = M/(Nλ) be the number of chunks at a given node.
P{C is not a valid code} = P (∃S with |S| = γN : |
⋃
i∈S











Ai| ≤ ηM) (A.4)





≤ 2NH(γ) = eNHe(γ), with H(.) being the binary entropy func-
tion measured in bits (logarithm to the base 2) and He being the binary entropy measured
in natural logarithm (nats), a standard inequality from the method of types [30].
The key question now is for a fixed S, we need to obtain an upper bound on P (|
⋃
i∈S Ai| ≤
ηM). We observe that under the random selection, we are choosing γ/λM chunks (sampled
randomly with replacement). The mathematical question now becomes, if we choose ρM
chunks randomly (with replacement) from M chunks, what is the probability that we get at
least ηM distinct chunks.
Lemma A.1. We sample ρM chunks from a set of M chunks randomly with replacement.
Let Y be the number of distinct chunks. Let x = (1− η)exp(ρ).
P(Y < ηM) ≤ e−(1−η)
(x−1)2
x(x+1)
Proof. Let Z = M−Y be the number of chunks not sampled. Then µ := E[Z] = (1− 1
M
)ρM ≈
Me−ρ (when M is large). We can write Z =
M∑
i=1
Zi, where Zi is the binary indicator random
variable indicating that chunk i is not sampled. We note that a direct application of tail
35
bounds for i.i.d. random variables does not work here. However, there are results analyzing
this problem in the context of balls-in-bins and they show that the following tail bound does
indeed hold (see Theorem 2 and Corollory 1 in [33]). We can write the tail bound on Z as
follows:
P (Z > `µ) ≤ e−
(`−1)2
1+`
µ ∀` > 1
QED.
Let η̄ = 1− η and ` = eρη̄, we get
P (Z > η̄M) ≤ e−
(eρη̄−1)2
eρ(eρη̄+1)
M if eρη̄ > 1 (A.5)
Define the function, f(η, ρ) = (e
ρη̄−1)2
eρ(eρη̄+1)
(we note that f(·) is a positive function), we have
P (Y < ηM) ≤ e−f(η,ρ)·M if ρ > log( 1
1−η ).
Continuing from before, we get








If we fix a N and take M large enough, we can make the right hand side large enough to
make the probability that C is not a valid code vanish to as small as we want. This result
has two interpretations: (1) as long as the probability of being a valid code is strictly greater
than zero, then it proves the existence of a deterministic chunk distribution algorithm, (2)
if we can make the probability of being a invalid code arbitrarily close to zero, then we
can use the randomized algorithm directly with a vanishing probability of error. Fixing a
N and taking M large can make the RHS arbitrarily small and thus the stronger second
interpretation can be used. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
A.2 PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
By definition, fj(i) can be decomposed to two functions, pj(i) and ej(i). According to









base symbols mapping to one symbol in layer j . In the worst case, γm` distinct base layer
symbols map to γm`
c
= γrmj distinct symbols in layer j in the range [0, rmj]. Similarly, there





1−r base layer symbols mapping to one symbol at layer j,
and therefore in the worst case there are γm`
d
= γ(1 − r)mj distinct symbols in the range
[rmj,mj). Since two range do not overlap, in total there are γmj distinct symbols for each
layer. Hence it completes the proof.
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A.3 PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
First we show for every i ∈ [m`] and 2 ≤ j < `, pj(i) and ej(i) are sibling. According to
the definition,
pj(i) = i mod rmj−1 = i mod qr
2mj−2 (A.7)
pj−1(i) = i mod rmj−2 (by definition) (A.8)
= pj(i) mod rmj−2 (discuss below) (A.9)
To prove equation A.9, suppose i = pj(i) + xqr
2mj−2 and i = pj−1(i) + yrmj−2 for some
integer x, y. By rearranging terms, pj(i)− pj−1(i) = rmj−2(y − xqr). If pj(i)− pj−1(i) 6= 0,
we mod rmj−2 on both sides, and therefore pj−1(i) = pj(i) mod rmj−2. If pj(i)−pj−1(i) = 0,
then obviously pj−1(i) = pj(i) mod rmj−2. Therefore in any case, equation A.9 holds, which
means pj−1(i) is the parent of pj(i).
Then let’s see another function ej(i), by definition we have
ej(i) = rmj−1 + (i mod (1− r)mj−1) (A.10)
= rmj−2qr + (i mod (1− r)qrmj−2) (A.11)
To calculate its parent according to aggregation rules, we get similar result that ej(i) −
pj−1(i) = rmj−2(y − xq(1− r)) thus
ej(i) = i mod (1− r)qrMj−2 (A.12)
= pj−1(i) mod rmj−2 (A.13)
pj−1(i) is also the parent of ej(i). Hence it completes the proof.
37
REFERENCES
[1] C. Cachin and S. Tessaro, “Asynchronous verifiable information dispersal,” in 24th
IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS’05). IEEE, 2005, pp. 191–
201.
[2] M. Yu, S. Sahraei, S. Li, S. Avestimehr, S. Kannan, and P. Viswanath, “Coded merkle
tree: Solving data availability attacks in blockchains,” in International Conference on
Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2020, pp. 114–134.
[3] “Aced library.” [Online]. Available: https://github.com/simplespy/ACeD.git
[4] V. Bagaria, S. Kannan, D. Tse, G. Fanti, and P. Viswanath, “Prism: Deconstructing
the blockchain to approach physical limits,” in Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2019, pp. 585–602.
[5] L. Yang, V. Bagaria, G. Wang, M. Alizadeh, D. Tse, G. Fanti, and P. Viswanath,
“Prism: Scaling bitcoin by 10,000 x,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.11261, 2019.
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